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Abstract
The principal agent problem is one of the major issues of the credit
rating agency market. Is it possible to solve the prevailing incentive
problem of the market and contemporaneously satisfy the reputation
demand of the investors? This paper presents an option for regulat-
ing the credit rating agency market more eﬀectively. The market
shall be coordinated through a central allocation oﬃce, which is act-
ing as a mediator between both contractual parties. The paper de-
velops a game theoretical approach that considers reputation as one
of the most important aspects within the market. After analysing
the status quo two policy options are discussed on a game theoret-
ical basis. The main result is that the incorporation of a mediator,
which awards the contracts based on a lottery drawing, would help to
solve conﬂicts of interests. The incentive to inﬂate ratings decreases
signiﬁcantly. Moreover, rating shopping option becomes impossi-
ble. Two possible positive side eﬀects for smaller CRAs and new
incumbents are the increase of market share as well as reputation.
Therefore, the market competition should be aﬀected positively, too.
JEL Classiﬁcation: G24, G28, D43, D82
Keywords: credit rating agencies, regulation, reputation, rating
inﬂation, rating shopping
I. Introduction
Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) have been in the focus of the public and of reg-
ulators within Europe since the world-wide ﬁnancial and economic crisis started
in 2007. CRAs are said to be a trigger of the ﬁnancial crisis owing to their rat-
ings for securitisations. Moreover, the inertia of CRAs regarding rating adjust-
ments, as seen for example in the case of Lehmann Brothers or some European
Countries, even increases the existing criticism. The erroneous developments,
incentives or the insuﬃcient liability have been focal points in the literature for
a long time.
Since 2009, the European Commission has tried to overcome the weaknesses of
the market by suggesting and implementing changes in the regulatory framework
within which the CRAs work. Finally, the European Commission has revised the
regulatory framework in November 2011 as it realised shortcomings and because
during the European debt crisis, emerging in 2010, politicians often criticised
that Europe is strongly dependent and inﬂuenced by the ‘big three’ (Moody’s,
S&P and Fitch, the trio).
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The focus of this paper is laid upon regulatory policy. Initially, we present
policy trends of 2011 within the European Union. Although, in our opinion,
the reform proposal of the European Commission is rather inappropriate to
solve the existing problems of the market it may be a step in a right direction.
The proposal is concentrating on transparency, the principal agent problem,
inappropriate liability, the inertia of CRAs, among others. The issue of conﬂict
of interests, however, arising from the business model remains unaddressed.
Some authors argue that an increase in market competition simultaneously raises
the incentives to inﬂate the credit ratings (see for example Bolton et al. 2012,
Camanho et al. 2011). For this reason the paper considers three game theoretical
approaches in order to investigate the current market situation as well as two
options for market regulation afterwards. The paper intends to demonstrate that
rating honestly is a Nash equilibrium. It cannot be excluded ﬁnally, however,
that in some cases a second equilibrium occurs (namely to rate inﬂationary).
Based on the theoretical results, we will discuss the status quo and an alternative
option based on a central allocation oﬃce, which is acting as a mediator between
both contractual parties. The mediator is also assumed to be responsible for
awarding the contracts based on a lottery drawing. To increase the incentives to
work accurately it seems to be advantageous that CRAs with higher reputation
obtain a higher probability to get drawn. Although basically the ‘issuer-pays’
model still exists, the framework seems to be appropriate to solve the conﬂict
of interests. Furthermore, the framework could enable smaller CRAs or new
incumbents to increase their reputation as well as their market share. Therefore,
this option may also help to increase market competition, at least indirectly.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: in section 2 the paper pro-
vides an overview about the literature. Next, recent developments of regulatory
framework within Europe will be discussed (section 3). In section 4, a game
theoretical investigation as well as a discussion of the results follow. Based on
the theoretical results a detailed description of a reform option is provided in
section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
II. Literature Review
The literature on rating agencies follows three main avenues. It ﬁrst approaches
the issue in complex theoretical models addressing the question of how competi-
tion is aﬀecting the eﬃcient outcome of the rating process. Using mainly game
theoretical models, models of monopoly or duopoly are analysed. Two aspects
of quality are of interests: honest rating on the supply side and rating shopping
on the demand side of rating markets. In an evolutionary game, Hirth (2012)
analyses the eﬀects of increasing competition on honest rating. Indeed, more
competition, i.e. the move from one to two suppliers, increases the likelihood of
honest rating. Similarly, Hörner (2001) shows that increasing competition raises
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the value of reputation. This holds in particular, if information is asymmetri-
cally distributed between the market sides. Doherty et al. (2009) argue that
market entry of a second supplier increases rating standards.1
However, other authors are less optimistic with respect to the eﬃciency of higher
competition. Mathis et al. (2009) argue that those ﬁrms earning the lion’s share
of their income rating complex products do not beneﬁt from reputation. Ac-
cording to Skreta and Veldkamp (2009) and Camanho et al. (2011) competition
increases rating shopping and decreases honest rating, respectively. Bolton et al.
(2012) add the investors’ perspective and show in their model that competition
is likely to reduce market eﬃciency. By the same token, the occurrence of an
investment boom contributes to inﬂationary ratings. Faure-Grimaud and Que-
sada (2009) show that competition reduces the willingness of issuers to publish
unfortunate ratings.
The second group within the literature comprises empirical papers, which results
of course are limited by the fact that there is an oligopoly in the market. Most
papers, in addition, deal with sovereign bonds risk, which we do not consider
here. The results are mainly indicating that competition is not increasing rat-
ing standards. Bongaerts et al. (2012) show that in case of a tie-break the third
opinion has a tendency to the better. Becker and Milbourn (2011) show that
higher competition induces inﬂationary ratings, whereas Jewell and Livingston
(1999) come to the conclusion that competition increases rating shopping. Ac-
cording to He et al. (2011), large issuers get better ratings than smaller issuers.
A diﬀerent opinion is held by Covitz and Harrison (2003), who argue that con-
ﬂict of interest is less important than reputation, thus there is a tendency to
increase the quality with rising competition.
The third strand of the literature is dealing with normative conclusions towards
better regulation of rating agencies. White (2010a,b) suggests to reduce the legal
requirements for investors to consider ratings in their decisions. Investors should
take more responsibility; the moral hazard problem should decrease. Partnoy
(2006, 2009) sees a lack of liability on the side of the rating agencies; were they
liable, honesty would increase, so his argument. In some papers, the ‘issuer-pays’
model is criticized (e.g. Mathis et al., 2009).2 Before, we develop our theoretical
analysis based on and informed by this literature (and its omissions), we brieﬂy
introduce the lessons the European Commission has drawn from the crisis.
1One paper analyses the role of single analysts and their incentives to change the job and go
to an issuer (Bar-Isaac and Shapiro, 2011). Interestingly such a move may reduce the rating
quality.
2It is also worth noting that after 2006, the general assessment of CRAs has become much
more negative than before.
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III. Policy Trends since 2011 - Proposal of the European Commission
Despite the critical views expressed in the literature, CRAs are necessary to
overcome information asymmetry. They are perceived to be important ﬁnancial
market participants, as their ratings aﬀect the behaviour of issuers as well as
investors. The resulting market power, however, is signiﬁcant and sometimes
disadvantageous. With the beginning of the ﬁnancial crisis but particularly in
the course of the European sovereign debt crisis public criticism of structure and
power of CRAs grew intensively. Therefore, the European Commission already
changed the European legislation on CRAs in 2009 and 2010. The adopted
regulations, however, have not been expedient and thus the European Commis-
sion issued a far-reaching reform proposal on November 15, 2011. We provide a
number of proposal details, without evaluating the issue in depth. Initially, the
European Commission is willing to address the principal agent problem, how-
ever, without rethinking the ‘issuer-pays’ business model of the CRAs. Rather
the reform approach provides two key aspects - rotation principle and the in-
crease of independence. The rotation principle provides that a CRA is only
allowed to have a contractual relationship of maximum three consecutive years
to one issuer (European Commission, 2011, Article 6b).3 The main target is to
address the above-mentioned problems as discussed by Bolton et al. (2012) and
Faltin-Traeger (2009). Moreover, the European Commission plans to disentan-
gle the conﬂict of interests resulting from the possibility when the issuer may be
contemporaneously a shareholder of a CRA.
The European Commission proposes the adoption of two main regulations. First,
it is discussed that one shareholder must not hold ﬁve per cent or more voting
rights of more than one CRA (European Commission, 2011, Article 6a). Second,
for shareholders a prohibition to distribute products, which have been rated by
the ‘own’ CRA, should be introduced. Another major concern about the rat-
ing market is that CRAs are “largely immune to civil and criminal liability
for malfeasance” (Partnoy, 2006, p. 61). CRAs indeed argue that their pri-
mary business focus revolves around the provision of economic journalism and,
therefore, the issued ratings are expressions of opinions. Notwithstanding the
European Commission (2011) adopts a proposal for a civil liability article (Arti-
cle 35a), which would enable investors to take action against CRAs if the rating
contains intentionally or grossly negligent mistakes. In order to help investors to
proof malfeasance it is proposed to reverse the burden of proof (Article 35a(4)).
Another point of criticism of the public and the regulators is the inertia of CRAs.
Enron (2001), Worldcom (2002), Lehman Brothers (2008) and the re-evaluation
3The European Commission also considers the case if one issuer has contractual relationships
to two CRAs. In this case the described maximum contract duration is only applicable for
one CRA. The contractual relationship to the other CRA, however, is not allowed to exceed
six consecutive years.
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of some European countries (e.g. Greece) within the current European sovereign
debt crisis are only a few examples where the adjustment of the ratings were
characterised by inertia.4 The European Commission especially wants to con-
front the large time lag in changes of sovereign ratings due to the systematic
risks, which can arise if a CRA downgrades the creditworthiness of a country
spontaneously. Therefore, the review period shall be shortened from 12 to six
months (Article 8(5)). The ﬁnal proposal detail that is addressed within this
paper is strongly connected to Skreta and Veldkamp (2009). They argue that
rating quality can be inﬂuenced adversely by the lack of sophisticated investors.
The European Commission adopted a regulation that obliges ﬁnancial institu-
tions (credit institutions, investment companies, insurance ﬁrms, among others)
to generate their own credit risk assessments in order to make them more so-
phisticated.5
Although the European Commission’s reform proposal is facing some important
aspects the approach seems rather inappropriate for the solution of the more
signiﬁcant problems, which are market power of oligopolists, imperfectly working
competition, principal agent problem and reputation being a key characteristic of
the market.6 To address these problems, the paper discusses two main questions.
1.) Is it possible and reasonable to disperse the market power of the three big
market participants. If so, how?
2.) Is it possible to solve the prevailing incentive problem of the market and
contemporaneously satisfy the reputation demand of the investors?
IV. Game Theoretical Model - Strategic Interaction and Payoﬀs
This section is dedicated to our theoretical analyses, which is informed by the
literature as well as the European Commission’s proposal. It discusses diﬀerent
policy frameworks in a simple game theoretical model. Each approach we con-
sider is deﬁned by divergent market regulations. All models are based Bolton
et al. (2012) and Hirth (2012). The following games are characterised as one-
shot games where all players move simultaneously and thus these are games of
imperfect information. Moreover, the games are deﬁned by common knowledge.
4To name two examples in more detail, in November 2001 “the three major rating agencies had
maintained ‘investment grade’ ratings on Enron’s bonds until ﬁve days before that company
declared bankruptcy” and in September 2008 “the major rating agencies still had ‘investment
grade’ ratings on Lehman Brothers’ commercial paper on the morning that Lehman declared
bankruptcy (...)” (White, 2010b, p. 218).
5CRAs do not become redundant due to this reform proposal. The main focus of the pro-
posed approach is to make ﬁnancial institutions more independent. In general, CRAs are
still important to support investors, particularly less sophisticated, to overcome the issue of
information asymmetry.
6In general, we would argue to establish the market reform proposal globally. This is as
credit rating can generate signiﬁcant international spillover eﬀects. An international reform
agreement, however, seems to be rather unrealistic.
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That means that all CRAs have symmetric information and therefore no CRA
has an informational advantage (Rasmusen, 2009).
Consider a market consisting of two main agents - CRAs and investors. There
are, however, also issuers and regulators, which are not modelled in detail. All
actors are risk neutral. Also assume that an issuer wants to issue an investment.
There are two diﬀerent types of investments. On the one hand there are good
investments. These investments are characterised by having a probability of
default of zero (p = 0) and generating a net return R > 0. On the other
hand, bad investments can generate the same net return as good investments,
as long as the investment does not default. The probability of default for bad
investments, nonetheless, is p > 0, because of which the expected net payoﬀ
is smaller than in the case of a good investment. Moreover, an investment is
randomly good with the probability of 0 < λ < 1.
IV.1. Status Quo Analysis
Under the regulatory status quo, no regulation exists that prescribes which CRA
an issuer has to choose. In fact, each issuer is able to decide individually. Owing
to its contractual relationship with the issuer, the CRA is obliged to rate the
investment. The commissioned CRA is paid a rating fee (φ) by the issuer.
Similar to Bolton et al. (2012) and Hirth (2012), we assume that a CRA only
receives the fee for a good rating (φG ≥ 0). The CRA receives no fee-payment
in cases when the credit rating is bad (φB = 0).7 This assumption enables to
model rating shopping in a reduced-form (Bolton et al., 2012 and Hirth, 2012).
As long as the issuer receives a negative rating grade it is possible to commission
another CRA. Moreover, it is assumed that the investors perceive an investment
without any rating as bad (similar to Hirth, 2012). It thus can be argued that
a credit rating has a positive impact for issuers.
The CRA in charge obtains a perfect signal (s) from the issuer. In cases when
the investment is good, the CRA obtains s = g, whereas in an alternative
scenario the signal is s = b. A CRA has two diﬀerent actions to choose. On the
one hand, the CRA can choose the strategy ‘honesty’ and thus works carefully.
Therefore, the CRA evaluates a good investment (g) with the grade G (good)
and the opposite investment with B (bad). In other words, the CRA is telling
the truth. On the other hand, the CRA can work opportunistically and inﬂates
a rating in cases when it receives a signal s = b but publishes the rating grade
G.8
7This assumption follows Bolton et al. (2012) who cite a report of the SEC (2008, p. 9):
“Typically, the rating agency is paid only if the credit rating is issued, though sometimes
it receives a break up fee for the analytic work undertaken even if the credit rating is not
issued.”
8An alternative scenario, in which a CRA works negligent, i.e. that a good investment receives
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After the CRA published the rating of an investment investors retain the pos-
sibility to buy an investment. Investors who participate in the market process,
however, may have diﬀerent qualities. In line with the research of Bolton et al.
(2012) as well as Hirth (2012) it is assumed that investors can be divided into
two diﬀerent groups. At one extreme, there are naive or trusting investors with
a share of 0 < α < 1 and, at the other extreme, there might be sophisticated
investors (1 − α). In this paper it is assumed that naive investors are not ca-
pable to estimate whether a CRA is working carefully or negligent. The reason
for this inability might be a lack of resources (time, capital) needed to evaluate
the work of CRAs. Therefore, less informed investors are trusting and reward a
qualitative good rating with a reputation premium only in cases the investment
does not default. Sophisticated investors, on the other hand, can be assumed
as professional market participants, such as banks, insurance companies, invest-
ment ﬁrms, pension funds. It is assumed that these investors are able to assess
immediately whether a CRA is working correctly. This ability, however, is cost
intensive and thus investors spend costs in shape of C > 0.9 Therefore, sophisti-
cated investors are only willing to reward qualitative good ratings independent
of the default of an investment.
As indicated above, both sophisticated and trusting investors reward CRAs for
qualitative appropriate ratings, however, there are diﬀerences between these
groups. Therefore, we assume in this paper that the reputation premium ρ
can be divided into two parts. There exists a reputation premium τ (τ ≥ 0)
belonging to trusting investors, whereas the reputation premium of sophisticated
investors is given by σ (σ ≥ 0). Thus, the whole reputation premium is deﬁned
as
ρ = α · τ + (1 − α) · σ. (1)
As pointed out previously, reputation is assumed to be an incentive for CRAs
to provide qualitative good work and tell the truth, respectively. Therefore, due
to the reputation premium the investors are able to punish failures of the CRAs
because every negative deviation from the maximum reputation premium ρ is
synonymous with reputation costs. Reputation costs can be assumed as the loss
of discounted sum of future CRA proﬁts.
Now we are considering the payoﬀs of CRAs.10 If the commissioned CRA decides
a negative rating grade, is not considered, because a CRA is only paid for good ratings (Hirth,
2012).
9According to Hirth (2012) the assumption that sophisticated investors recognise and punish
inﬂating CRAs immediately is strong. “However, the assumption is consistent with the
previous assumption that investments turn out to be good or bad (without any uncertainty
due to overlapping realizations of the outcomes) immediately after making the investment
decision” (Hirth, 2012, p. 9).
10Due to the fact that the main focus of this paper lies on CRAs and their payoﬀs we are not
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to rate honestly, it only evaluates good investments as good. It receives fees
and the reputation premium only for good investments, which occurs with a
probability λ. In cases a CRA rates a bad investment honestly, the rating will
not be published and the issuer commissions another CRA. Therefore, the CRA
in charge receives no payment and is not able to obtain the reputation premium.
The payoﬀs against trusting (XHT ) and sophisticated (XHS) investors are
XHT = λ · (φG + τ) (2)
XHS = λ · (φG + σ). (3)
Consequently, the resulting expected payoﬀ for the CRA in charge is
ΠH = λ · (φG + ατ + (1 − α) · σ). (4)
On the other hand, a CRA can decide to inﬂate ratings. Therefore, the CRA
always issues good ratings independent of the investment’s quality. If the CRA
is meeting trusting investors they receive
XIT = λ · (φG + τ) + (1 − λ) · [φG + (1 − p)τ ]. (5)
The CRA always receives the fee payment (φG). Moreover, the CRA can obtain a
reputation premium. However, whether the CRA is punished for rating inﬂation
depends on the default of the bad investment. Sophisticated investors identify
the rating inﬂation immediately and punish the CRA. Therefore, if the CRA is
meeting sophisticated investors they receive
XIS = φG + λσ. (6)
The resulting expected payoﬀ for a CRA that is choosing the inﬂating strategy
is
ΠI = φG + α · (1 − p + λp)τ + (1 − α) · λσ. (7)
All payoﬀs for the CRA are summarized in the following table:
discussing the payoﬀs of the investors. For more detail see Hirth (2012) as well as Bolton
et al. (2012).
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Table 1: Status Quo - Two-Player Game in Normal Form
CRA honest inﬂating
Investors
trusting
λ · (φG + τ) λ · (φG + τ)
+(1 − λ) · [φG + (1 − p)τ ]
... ...
sophisticated
λ · (φG + σ) φG + λσ
... ...
expected λ · (φG + ατ + (1 − α) · σ) φG + α · (1 − p + λp)τ + (1 − α) · λσ
Although the description of the status quo is shortened11 and deﬁned as a one-
shot game, the main results are reasonable. On the one hand, for honest CRAs
it is impossible to generate the complete market reputation. This is because
an issuer is allowed to decide individually whether to publish a bad rating or
to commission another CRA that would evaluate the issuer another time (rat-
ing shopping). Owing to the ‘issuer-pays’ business model in connection to the
principal agent problem it can be rational, on the other hand, to inﬂate bad
investments.
IV.2. Random Rating Allocation to one CRA
The game theoretical analysis of the status quo demonstrates that two main
issues of the credit rating market are rating inﬂation and rating shopping. Next
we ask the question of whether a randomisation would be helpful to overcome
these problems. For this purpose, we are assuming the establishment of a medi-
ator (or central allocation oﬃce). The mediator shall prevent direct contractual
relationships between the issuer and the CRA in charge.
Imagine a pool of accredited CRAs able to rate the issuer adequately. The cen-
tral allocation agency draws randomly and anonymously a CRA that receives
the order to rate the issuer or its products. The evaluation of the CRA will
be issued, independent of the ﬁnal outcome. Therefore, it becomes impossible
for the issuer to choose the rating shopping alternative when the issuer’s invest-
ment is evaluated negatively. Owing to the fact that the rating report is issued
deﬁnitely, the CRA receives the fee-payment (φ > 0) certainly. As already dis-
cussed above, the CRA in charge has two possible actions to choose - honest
and negligent/inﬂating12.
To start, we are considering the payoﬀs of a CRA selecting to act honestly.
Owing to the changed payment structure an honest CRA receives fees for both
11For a detailed analysis of the status quo it is referred to Bolton et al. (2012) as well as Hirth
(2012).
12Due to the varied payment structure it is possible that the CRA evaluates a good investment
as bad. In this case the CRA would rate negligent than rather inﬂating.
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good (m = G) and bad (m = B) rating reports. Moreover, the CRA is able to
gain earnings of the discounted sum of future CRA proﬁts. As mentioned above,
sophisticated investors have the ability to evaluate the CRA report immediately
after publication. Trusting investors are not capable to evaluate the CRA report.
The quality of their evaluation is dependent on whether the investment defaults
or not. Therefore, we assume that if a single CRA reports m = B and the
investment does not default, the CRA is punished by trusting investors. This
is because a single CRA cannot convey credibly that they rated correctly. The
payoﬀs of a CRA meeting trusting (XHT ) and sophisticated (XHS) investors,
respectively, are
XHT = λ · (φ + τ) + (1 − λ) · (φ + pτ) = φ + (λ + p − λp) · τ (8)
XHS = φ + σ. (9)
The resulting expected payoﬀ for a CRA that acts honestly is
ΠH = φ + (1 − α)σ + α · (λ + p − λp)τ. (10)
Furthermore, a CRA can decide to rate negligently and inﬂate ratings, respec-
tively. In other words, the CRA is not reporting the received signal. As men-
tioned above, if a CRA is meeting sophisticated investors they will discover the
misjudgement. Therefore, the CRA is punished and receives only the fees. The
punishment by the naive investors is depending on two facts: First, a good in-
vestment obtains a bad rating. Therefore, a negligent CRA is punished due to
the fact that good investments never default (p = 0). Second, if an investment
is bad the punishment depends on the default. A CRA incurs reputation costs
only in cases when the bad investment, which is rated as good, defaults (with a
probability of p). While with the complementary probability no default occurs
and the CRA earns τ . Thus the CRA earns
XIT = φ + (1 − λ) · (1 − p)τ (11)
XIS = φ. (12)
Consequently, the resulting expected payoﬀ for the CRA is
ΠI = φ + α · (1 − λ)(1 − p)τ. (13)
All payoﬀs for the CRA are summarized in the following table:
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Table 2: Random Rating Allocation to one CRA - Two-Player Game in Nor-
mal Form
CRA honest inﬂating
Investors
trusting
φ + (λ + p − λp)τ φ + (1 − λ) · (1 − p)τ
... ...
sophisticated
φ + σ φ
... ...
expected φ + (1 − α)σ + α · (λ + p − λp)τ φ + α · (1 − λ)(1 − p)τ
The random rating allocation process, where the mediator draws one CRA, has
shown itself useful to solve the problem of rating shopping. Moreover, it could
reduces the probability of inﬂating signiﬁcantly. Thus, due to the randomisa-
tion the incentive structure improved. However, the incentive to inﬂate ratings
depends signiﬁcantly on two variables. It increases with the share of trusting
investors and decreases with the probability of default of the bad investment.
There is one major criticism: the mediator is only drawing one CRA. Owing
to this framework the drawn CRA achieves a ‘sequential’ monopolistic position.
For this reason trusting investors cannot be protected expediently because this
approach permitted no second opinion.
IV.3. Random Rating Allocation to two CRAs
After discussing the random rating allocation to one CRA on a game theoretical
basis, we now consider the case when two CRAs are randomly drawn. Simi-
larly to the scenario above, the mediator draws randomly and anonymously two
diﬀerent CRAs that receive the order to rate the issuer or its products. There-
fore, one can argue that the resulting covered game is determined exogenously.
The rules of the game remain unchanged. Each CRA has the ability to select
between two actions. The decisions of CRAs are taken simultaneously. There-
fore, it is possible that both CRAs rate honestly or negligently. Moreover, it is
also possible that both CRAs disagree. These potential outcomes determine the
expected payoﬀ for each CRA because they are mutually dependent.
First, we consider the case of both CRAs acting honestly. Therefore, both
CRAs report m = G (m = B) conditional on a good (bad) signal. Since the
default probability of a good investment is zero, the CRAs receive the complete
reputation premium of the trusting investors. Moreover, they also receive the
reputation premium σ because sophisticated investors realise the qualitative
good work. Thus, no matter what kind of investment needs to be rated the
payoﬀ is deﬁned as
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XG|g = XB|b = φ + ρ. (14)
Thus, the expected payoﬀ for an honest CRA (ΠHH), on condition that the
other CRA is selecting the same action, is
ΠHH = λ · XG|g + (1 − λ) · XB|b = φ + ρ. (15)
In the second case, once again both CRAs agree regarding the strategies chosen,
though they are not telling the truth - either the CRAs act negligently or they
inﬂate. In this scenario the payoﬀs, however, diﬀer among each other. Initially,
imagine the case where a good investment is rated as bad (m = B). The result
of this negligence is that sophisticated investors punish the CRAs because they
are able to detect the incorrect rating. Owing to the fact, however, that both
CRAs work incorrectly trusting investors are not able to detect the negligence.
Therefore, only the sophisticated investors punish the CRAs. And thus the
payment structure is the following
XB|g = φ + ατ. (16)
Now we are considering that a bad investment is simultaneous rated as good
by both CRAs. Again, sophisticated investors detect the inﬂationary rating,
however, trusting investors are now depending on whether a default occurs.
With a probability of p a default occurs and the CRAs get punished but with
the opposite probability the CRAs earn τ :
XG|b = φ + α · (1 − p)τ. (17)
When taking both payment structures together the following expected payoﬀ is
determined by:
ΠNN = φ + (1 − p + λ · p) · ατ. (18)
Finally, consider a situation when both CRAs choose conﬂicting actions. Basi-
cally, CRAs should help to solve information asymmetry, however, a disagree-
ment in their ratings creates uncertainty. Whereas sophisticated investors are
able to detect the correct rating, trusting investors are completely unsure which
CRA is telling the truth. Therefore, we assume that a third CRA will be charged
randomly to rate the issuer for a third time and thus acting as a tiebreaker.13
The tiebreaker function shall reduce market uncertainty, however, it can’t be
taken for granted that the tiebreaker is automatically rating honestly.
13Bongaerts et al. (2012) argue that Fitch often functions as a tiebreaker in cases when
Moody’s and S&P disagree in their rating reports.
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When considering the expected payoﬀ of a CRA that is choosing honesty while
the second CRA is choosing negligence the honest CRA deﬁnitely receives the
fees. Moreover, the sophisticated investors also recognise the honest rating (G | g
and B | b) and therefore the CRA earns σ additionally. However, whether
the honest CRA earns τ and thus the whole reputation premium depends on
the probability z, which determines whether the tiebreaker is choosing honesty,
too. In other words, if the tiebreaker is rating negligently the CRA is punished
although working carefully and honestly. Therefore, the expected payoﬀ for the
honest CRA is determined by
XG|g = XB|b = φ + (1 − α) · σ + z · ατ (19)
and thus the expected payoﬀ, on condition that the other CRA is selecting
negligent (or inﬂating), is
ΠHN = φ + (1 − α) · σ + z · ατ. (20)
The CRA that provides negligent or inﬂationary ratings may be aﬀected posi-
tively by the disagreement with the other CRA. Sophisticated investors will pun-
ish the negligent CRA certainly. Additionally, the punishment of naive investors
depends on the tiebreaker because trusting investors do not have the ability to
diﬀerentiate between truth and lie. Therefore, they are following the majority.
The probability that a tiebreaker is also choosing the negligent/inﬂating action
is determined by (1 − z). Beyond the dependence on the third CRA decision, it
is essential that the default of the investment does not occur, otherwise trusting
investors punish the respective CRA. Therefore, the expected payoﬀ of the CRA
that is choosing negligence is determined by:
XB|g = φ + (1 − z) · ατ, (21)
XG|b = φ + (1 − z) · (1 − p) · ατ, and (22)
ΠNH = φ + λ · (1 − z) · ατ + (1 − λ) · [(1 − z) · (1 − p)ατ ]. (23)
So far, the expected payoﬀs demonstrate the importance of the reputation pre-
mium, which can diﬀer signiﬁcantly between the cases discussed.14 Table 3 shows
that it is possible to investigate whether an equilibrium exists. The proposed
framework for CRA market may be adequate to solve the conﬂict of interests.
In every situation of the game a CRA in charge deﬁnitely gets paid by the issuer
- regardless of whether the rating is good or bad because the central allocation
agency monitors the complete rating process.
14It is important to mention that reputation becomes relevant after the ﬁrst period. Therefore,
we consider reputation as discounted proﬁts of future periods, as already mentioned above.
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Owing to the mediator, reputation costs become a major threat for CRAs. By
analysing the game matrix in more detail it becomes obvious that a Nash equi-
librium exists.15 Therefore, rating honestly is the optimal action because it
generates the maximum expected payoﬀ.
Table 3: Two-Player Game in Normal Form
CRA2 honest negligent/inﬂating
CRA1
honest φ + ρ φ + λ · (1 − z) · ατ
+(1 − λ) · [(1 − z) · (1 − p)ατ ]
φ + ρ φ + (1 − α) · σ + z · ατ
negligent/
inﬂating
φ + (1 − α) · σ + z · ατ φ + (1 − p + λ · p) · ατ
φ + λ · (1 − z) · ατ
+(1 − λ) · [(1 − z) · (1 − p)ατ ] φ + (1 − p + λ · p) · ατ
In most cases if one CRA is choosing to rate negligently the optimal reaction
for the other CRA is to be honest. Under certain circumstances, however, a
second Nash equilibrium may occur. The most relevant variables to be examined
thoroughly are α (the share of trusting investors in the market) and z (the
probability that a third CRA is selecting honesty). Skreta and Veldkamp (2009)
claim that a small share of sophisticated investors negatively aﬀect the rating
quality. The respective critical values can be determined as follows:
α∗∗ = σ
σ + τ · (1 + λp − p − z) , (24)
z∗ = (1 − p + λ · p) · ατ − (1 − α) · σ
ατ
. (25)
As long as the probability that a potential third CRA is honest (z) is exceeding
the critical value z∗ the described game is characterised by having one Nash
equilibrium (H, H). In cases when z ≤ z∗, however, there exist two Nash equi-
libria (H, H and N, N). On the other hand, in cases when the share of trusting
investors does not exceed the critical value (α < α∗∗) there exists only one equi-
librium (H, H). In other words, the less the number of sophisticated investors
participating in the market the more likely is a second equilibrium and thus the
incentive to rate negligent.
Moreover, one might ask in which way α and z∗ interact with each other. The
higher α the higher becomes z∗. This result can be interpreted as follows: if
a CRA anticipates that the share of trusting investors in the market is rather
large, the uncertainty regarding the expected payoﬀ increases. The uncertainty
increases because if the second CRA chooses to rate negligent the probability
15Although the presented models are all one-shot games the main results would probably not
change by extending the time horizons of the models.
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of getting a higher expected payoﬀ when choosing honesty becomes smaller due
to the fact that z∗ is raising. In other words, if the CRA is anticipating that α
is suﬃciently high and z is suﬃciently low, it becomes rational to diﬀerentiate
from the strategy to be honest if the second CRA is selecting negligence.
To sum up in cases when the thresholds are not exceeded (α < α∗∗; α deﬁnes
the share of trusting investors) or fallen below (z > z∗; z deﬁnes the probability
that a potential third CRA rates honest) there exists only one equilibrium.
This deﬁnes the dominant strategy. In this context, two extreme cases may be
mentioned brieﬂy. 1) Only sophisticated investors participate in the market (α =
0): In such an extreme situation the case of disagreement and thus the opinion
of a third CRA is redundant. If one CRA would deviate from the dominant
strategy (rate honest) the optimal reaction would always be to rate honest.
Therefore, a deviation from the dominant strategy will never be advantageous
for a CRA. Thus, in cases when only sophisticated investors participate in the
market only one Nash equilibrium occurs. 2) Only trusting investors participate
in the market (α = 1): The appearance of a second Nash equilibrium becomes
more likely, however not certainly. This is as the threshold term in this extreme
case z∗EC becomes larger than z∗. Nevertheless, the appearance of a second Nash
equilibrium still depends on the realisation of the probability that a potential
third CRA rates honest (z). Owing to the reform proposal it is possible to
overcome the conﬂict of interests.
IV.4. Comparison of the Options for an Appropriate Regulation
The game theoretical analyses demonstrates that divergent regulation frame-
works result in diﬀerent payment structures. All payoﬀs are summarised in
Table 4. This overview displays the following results: First, randomly placing
orders is preferred to the status quo owing to the increase (decrease) of expected
payoﬀs if a CRA is acting honestly (negligently and inﬂationary, respectively).
Second, by focusing on the scenarios of drawing one or two CRAs it becomes
obvious that the expected payoﬀs increase if a CRA is acting honestly. Ac-
cording to these results we argue that a regulatory framework that places the
orders randomly seems to be more adequate to solve the incentive problems of
the market.
In this regard, a further question is which alternative of the random rating
allocation is more preferable. In cases when only one CRA is drawn we argue
that a ‘sequential’ monopolistic position is generated and this position entails
risks. In the following we compare the case of drawing one CRA with random
rating allocation of two CRAs. Therefore, we concentrate on the comparison of
the critical values α∗ and α∗∗.16 The comparison of these critical values enables
16α∗ represents the critical value of the scenario when one CRA is randomly drawn, whereas
α∗∗ represents the critical value for the second scenario.
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us to analysis in which scenario the incentive to inﬂate is more present.17 The
respective critical values can be determined as follows:
α∗ = σ
σ + τ · (1 + 2λp − 2λ − 2p) , (26)
α∗∗ = σ
σ + τ · (1 + λp − p − z) . (27)
If we assume that α∗ equals α∗∗ it arises
z∗∗ = 2λ + (1 − λ)p. (28)
As long as z > z∗∗ the critical value of α∗∗ > α∗. This means that in the case of
drawing two CRAs the share of trusting investors needs to be higher before the
inﬂationary strategy becomes rational. Therefore, the random rating allocation
to two CRAs is advantageous. Moreover, if z → 1 the scenario of drawing two
CRAs is always more advantageous.
17As argued above, if α is exceeding α∗ or α∗∗ it becomes rational to choose the inﬂating
strategy. This is as too many trusting investors are market participants.
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IV.5. Potential Allocation Eﬀects
After discussing possible regulation options the allocation eﬀects may be of
interest, which will be brieﬂy and intuitively discussed. An introduction of
a new regulation would likely increase the costs in several ways; for example
the costs for establishing and maintaining a central allocation agency or the
increase in costs for smaller issuers, which would have to pay for two ratings.
Owing to the mediator solution, however, we would expect signiﬁcant allocation
improvements, especially in a dynamic manner.
First of all, owing to the incentive to elaborate veridical ratings it is likely that
the allocation increases signiﬁcantly. Ratings provide information for investors
and therefore a higher number of veridical ratings should lead to a more eﬃcient
allocation of capital. Second, we would expect an increase in conﬁdence of
capital markets. This is because the new regulation would reduce the principal
agent problem signiﬁcantly. Conﬁdences in capital markets and in the quality
of information, respectively, are two elementary requirements when deciding to
invest in a risky asset. Therefore, it can be assumed that the proposed regulation
approach would result in an increase of capital released, although the costs for
exploitation of information are likely to increase, too. Thus, more risky projects
can be realised owing to the fact that more capital is available within the market.
Besides these direct allocation eﬀects, the proposed regulation approach is likely
to aﬀect the market diﬀerently and improve eﬃciency. Depending on the exact
organisation of the rating process, it enables smaller CRAs to enter the market.
This would probably lead to the destruction of the oligopoly. We also expect a
the reduction of the two incentive problems.
Alongside the advantages of the discussed approach there are negative aspects,
too. First, the ﬂow of information between the issuer and the CRA is distorted,
since there is no direct contact between them. According to the regulatory
capture theory it second might be possible that the regulator tries to increase
its importance and maintain it in the long run. In other words, once a new
regulation is created it could become increasingly diﬃcult to abolish the rule
in future, when the desired eﬀects have been reached. Moreover, the proposal
seems to be inappropriate to solve the issue of the focal points. As mentioned
above, CRAs are of importance for market participants because they justify herd
behaviour and help to coordinate the investors’ beliefs (Boot et al., 2006).
V. Policy Implications
The theoretical analysis suggests the establishment of a pooling-solution in the
shape of a central allocation agency for the purpose of solving the conﬂict of
interests. This allocation agency could be a European institution, thereby being
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independent from politics in order to build up credibility in ﬁnancial markets.
The main assignment of the central allocation agency is the organisation of the
rating market, whereas consisting regulation and monitoring still remains in the
hands of the European Securities and Market Authority (ESMA).
As said above, a central allocation agency (in the shape of a mediator) is ap-
propriate to cut the direct contractual relationships and thus the conﬂict of
interests. The potential issuer is not allowed to contact the CRA directly and
vice versa. Therefore, the issuer has to commission the mediator in order to
start the rating process. The issuer has to communicate the requested contrac-
tual duration18 as well as a range of fees that the issuer is willing to pay. In
addition, the issuer has to provide all relevant information about the products
that shall be rated. This is not trivial, since the information cannot be provided
in direct contact between issuer and rating agency. As under the status quo,
the issuer is stilling paying for its ratings, however Mathis et al. (2009) call this
payment structure as platform-based. As demonstrated above, the issuer-paid
business model in connection with a mediator solution is appropriate to reduce
conﬂict of interests.
Subsequently, the central allocation agency contacts the pool of CRAs. A CRA
automatically becomes a participant of the CRA-pool once it has been registered
and certiﬁed by the ESMA.19 The mediator provides information about the
issuer as well as the extend of the commission. Therefore, each CRA obtains
the opportunity of a free choice whether the CRA wants to participate in the
ongoing rating process. This is important because of two diﬀerent aspects. First,
smaller CRAs might have limited resources and thus might not be able to serve
appropriate quality for further issuers. Secondly, one takes into consideration
that also niche providers are in the market and they might not be able or willing
to serve all market segments. When a CRA decides to participate in the following
process they also have to submit a ﬁnancial oﬀer.
The central allocation oﬃce possesses information about the demand side’s will-
ingness to pay and the supply side’s ﬁnancial requirements, among others. As-
sume that there is no intersection regarding the ﬁnancial aspects of the contract.
Therefore, the central allocation agency enables each participant anonymously
to renew the respective oﬀers. It is conceivable to repeat this procedure, if nec-
essary. Two results are possible: First, no intersection has arisen or less than
three CRAs are within the bandwidth. In this case the regulatory requirements
18According to the adopted European Commission regulations, however, the maximum con-
tract duration is three years.
19Every CRA is allowed to apply at the ESMA. The ESMA is obliged to assess the com-
pleteness of the application and whether the compliance of the regulations determined by
European Parliament and Council are fulﬁlled. At the time this paper was written “16
CRAs have been registered and a Japanese CRA has been certiﬁed” by the ESMA (2012,
p. 5). In cases when the application is rejected the ESMA is obliged to provide a detailed
report. This application process ensures transparency.
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are not fulﬁlled and therefore the rating process stops. In this case the issuer
obtains no rating. Second, an intersection has arisen and the oﬀers of at least
three diﬀerent CRAs are within the bandwidth. Then the rating process can be
continued and each CRA, which is still too expensive, will be excluded. If all
requirements of the European Parliament and Council are fulﬁlled by the CRAs
the ﬁnal pool of CRAs, for the respective case, is given.
Finally, the central allocation agency raﬄes two CRAs. It is conceivable that
CRAs with higher reputation obtain a higher possibility to be drawn.20 This is
due to increase the importance of high reputation and thus increase the incen-
tive to elaborate sound ratings.21 The drawn CRAs are commissioned to rate
the issuer. The allocation, however, is anonymous and the disclosure, which
CRAs obtained the commission, takes place when the mediator issues both rat-
ings at the same time and therefore solves the covered game. This proceeding is
advantageous because a positive correlated rating tendency between the respec-
tive CRAs can be excluded. Moreover, each CRA has to provide all relevant
information, such as methodology and used parameters, to the central allocation
oﬃce. This bundle of information is necessary for the case when investors take
legal action against CRAs if the rating contains intentionally or grossly negligent
mistakes.22
All in all, this policy option for the European rating market has a number
of diﬀerent positive aspects. Basically the approach is easy to adopt and can
be harmonised with the consisting regulations of the European Union. More-
over, the proposal is appropriate to solve critical characteristics of the consisting
credit rating market. Most importantly, this approach is appropriate to solve
the principal agent problem. The mediator solution allows to maintain the basic
principles of the ‘issuer-pays’ business model, however it is now based on plat-
form (Mathis et al., 2009). The suggested approach is able to break the market
power of the trio owing to the fact that the issuer is not allowed to select a CRA
independently.
In addition, reputation seems to be very important to be a successful market
participant. Owing to transparency of the ESMA requirements both qualitative
standards are created and the reputation of smaller CRAs could be raised, which
could increases market acceptance. The transparency of requirements generates
another advantage - reduction of barriers of entry. One might argue that a
20Imagine the pool of accredited CRAs as an urn. New incumbents and CRAs with low
reputation obtain one ball, whereas, for example, a CRA with high reputation obtains three
balls. For such an allocation the mediator sets the conditions.
21It would be also possible to suspend CRAs if reckless ratings accumulate signiﬁcantly.
22One might argue that the liability risk would demise to the central allocation oﬃce due
to the fact that they possess all information. In this context the main task of the central
allocation oﬃce, however, is only the storage of information and not the evaluation of the
rating. Therefore, the central allocation oﬃce would provide the information in case of a
lawsuit.
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registration as condition to enter the market would increase the barriers of entry.
This might be correct in the ﬁrst place, however, the application of a lottery of
orders will ﬁnally reduce barriers of entry. This is due to the fact that a lottery
drawn increases the probability of gaining market share. Moreover, one should
keep in mind that already 16 CRAs have been registered and certiﬁed by the
ESMA.23
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, we provide an option for an appropriate CRA regulation. We
mainly address the question of whether it is possible to change the market
structure and decrease the market’s incentive problems, whereas the principle
of the ‘issuer-pays’ model remains unchanged. To support our regulatory policy
option we develop a game theoretical approach. Our analysis comprises three
diﬀerent scenarios: (i) the status quo, (ii) random rating allocation to one CRA
and (iii) random rating allocation to two CRAs.
Moreover, we evaluate the current proposal of the European Commission. Al-
though many aspects discussed within this proposal are important, the conﬂict
of interests as the main issue remains unaddressed. Therefore, we argue that
European policymakers should reconsider their proposal. The restructuring of
the CRA market, as this paper provides options, seems to be necessary in order
to counter market problems.
Our analysis shows that a restructuring of the CRA market by establishing a
mediator could help to solve the incentive problems. This is because in our pro-
posed option the central allocation oﬃce is able the break critical contractual
relationships. The allocation oﬃce is responsible for awarding the contracts
based on a lottery drawing. Moreover, the game theoretical analysis demon-
strates that rating honestly is a Nash equilibrium. Although, it cannot be
excluded that a second equilibrium occurs (namely to rate inﬂationary), the
probability for this outcome decreases signiﬁcantly and mainly depends on the
share of sophisticated investors. Moreover, the options provided in this paper
could be appropriate to enable smaller CRAs or new incumbents to increase
23At this point, one should mention the importance of minimum capital requirements. Since
the Basel II Accord entered into force capital requirements for ﬁnancial institutions increased
signiﬁcantly. In order to assess the risk adequately ﬁnancial institutions are allowed to
use nationally approved CRAs. For example, the German Federal Financial Supervisory
Authority (BaFin) recognised seven CRAs. According to the authors’ opinion, there are
two main reasons for this discrepancy. 1.) The CRAs, which are registered by the ESMA,
partly oﬀer diﬀerent rating products. Thus, not every rating product is appropriate for risk
weighting. 2.) In Germany, for example, to become approved by the BaFin a potential CRA
has to name the ﬁnancial institutions which are interested in using the respective rating for
their individual risk weighting. With regard to the proposed approach one should consider
a simpliﬁcation of the national approval process.
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their reputation as well as their market share. These aspects would aﬀect the
market competition positively.
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